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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appellant, Jesse Riddle submits this reply brief in the appeal before this Court.
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ARGUMENT
1.

Pop-up Advertisements Fit Within the Definition of the Act and Should
Be Included Therein.

The statute underlying this action was, at the time this suit was originally filed, a new
and unexamined statute. The statute was an attempt by the state legislature to relieve Utahns
from the burdens caused by unsolicited commercial emails. Although Appellants recognize
the statute has been repealed in response to the passing of a new federal statute dealing with
this pernicious problem at a Federal level, the Utah statute had not been repealed at the time
the Appellant was SPAMMED, nor had it been repealed at the time he filed his original
complaint, nor had it been repealed on the date he gave notice of his intent to appeal the
district court's decision. This action was and is an attempt by a Utah citizen to enforce
rights that had been statutorily provided him at the time he filed his action. It was important
to him then and remains important to him now.
Appellee insinuates several times in its brief that because the statute has since been
repealed that there ought not be time or effort wasted on a proper determination of
Appellant's claim. That however is improper. The rights Appellant had at the time he
received the email are the same rights that should be considered at this point. SPAM
remains such a problem that Federal legislation has now been adopted to try and deal with
this scourge. Further, the decision of this case is important for the Appellant. Any
suggestions to the contrary are without merit and an attempt to distract the Court.
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Furthermore, in an apparent attempt to vilify the Plaintiff and his attorneys, they
include as a footnote the untrue assertion that Plaintiffs counsel has filed more than 1200
similar cases. This number has been loosely thrown around by Appellee's counsel
throughout this litigation. It seems difficult to reconcile the assertion on the one hand that
this is just one simple meaningless case and on the other that there are some "1200" cases
in the wings. In reality there other cases that have been filed, although the number nowhere
approaches that suggested by Appellees in this case. In turn, each of those cases will be
affected by the decision of the Court in this case. Therefore this case does not decide a moot
point as suggested by Appellants.
Pop-up advertisements, like the message in this suit, are of the type of "email"
covered by the statute. The definition section in Utah's Anti Spam statute provides that popup advertisements are indeed covered by the Act and their inclusion in the statute was
contemplated by the legislature.
Utah Code §13-36-102(3), defines email as " . . . an electronic message, file, data, or
other information that is transmitted: (a) between two or more computers, computer
networks, or electronic terminals; or (b) within a computer network." Just as Appellee
agrees, this is a very broad definition. A broad definition that seems obvious it was intended
to cover all unsolicited electronic messages, in whatever electronic form they are sent. As
pointed out by Appellee, the legislature knows how to be specific and to narrow the scope
of any statute. They apparently have done so with the recently enacted Spyware Control
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Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-36-40, et seq. It seems more obvious that the legislature
intentionally left the Utah Unsolicited Commercial Email Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-36101, et seq. broad so as to cover the types of electronic messages sent in this case as well.
Appellees argue that pop ups and pop unders are not sent through email service
providers, but rather through internet service providers. That argument is made without any
citation to any fact established in the record. That is an unknown and, for the purposes of
this matter, unverifiable allegation. That was one of the very purposes for the Appellant's
prior motion for 56(f) relief. Plaintiff is not a computer or internet specialist, neither are his
counsel. For that matter, Defendant is apparently a cruise line and there have been no
supporting facts produced that either it or its counsel has expertise in the area. That simply
has not been produced, but the information is necessary for the Court to make a proper
decision.
Appellee also argues that the weight of the legislative history falls in their favor.
Appellee bases that argument upon the use of the term SPAM in the legislative debates
before the House and the Senate. Appellee, however can cite to nowhere in the legislative
record where SPAM is defined by the legislature. Citations to comments made by Senator
Arent such as "[t]his bill concerns unsolicited commercial email, also known as SPAM" and
that the intended purpose was to place "some reasonable limitations on SPAMers" and to
provide a remedy for consumers, email service providers and businesses that bear the cost
of receiving SPAM," do not define or even quantify the term. A pop up or pop under fits
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under those statements as any other type of SPAM. Appellee apparently acknowledges that
fact because instead of providing the Utah legislature's definition, it turns to case law and
a web-based dictionary to support their argument. There is no question that pop ups and pop
unders create cost for their recipients. Maybe even as much or more costs than an actual
email. An email could potentially be ignored, but the recipient of a pop up or pop under
must deal with it in someway before he or she can do anything else with their computer. In
some ways the intrusion is worse with a pop up or pop under than an email. In all
probability most internet users have either experienced first hand or heard of those infamous
pornographic pop ups that pop up in a string or succession that cannot be closed fast enough
and eventually require a whole system to be shut down before eliminating them from view.
This is the protection the Utah legislature was seeking for Utah's citizens. It certainly is not
an overly broad definition to include pop ups and pop unders within the meaning of an
electronic communication.
Appellee also cites to certain legislative record occurring after the statute had been
passed, supposedly clarifying the meaning of the statute. That record should not even be
considered. It relates to an amendment to the actual statute, an amendment that was not
passed, but that might have eliminated this question altogether. That amendment reflects
new and different opinions and efforts by Utah legislatures, not those opinions, efforts, or
testimony relied upon for the statute that was actually passed. Although those statements
appear to say what Appellees want them to say, they come in a time when they can not be
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taken to limit or refine the meaning previously given, especially when they were made in
relation to an amendment to the statute, that was not passed. They should not be considered.
Appellee further argues that to adopt pop ups and pop unders within the meaning of
the statute, would result in an absurd outcome. This suggestion is made because "pop-up"
advertisements do not contain a subject line. Therefore, the argument goes, "how could the
spammer comply with the Act that requires 'ADW to be included in the subject line, when
a pop-up advertisement currently has no subject line?" This argument is flawed in at least
two aspects. First, a spammer can add a subject line to any pop-up, just as they add text and
other sophisticated graphics within the message. To comply, the spammer simply needs to
add a subject line. It is disingenuous to choose the format of the pop-up, which format
violates Utah law, and then argue that the pop-up is not covered because the format does not
have a subject line.
Second, the defendants fail to understand the intent of the statute. There is no
prohibition in sending pop-up's that do not contain a subject line. Appellees can send popup advertising to their clients as often as they like, even ad's that do not have the statutory
requirements, because their client has a "relationship" with them. Spammers who send popup's, if they chose not to include a subject line or to comply with other strictures of the act,
are free to send pop-up's to those with whom they have existing or preexisting relationships.
If they chose to send it to any others, they must comply with the Act.
2.

Appellant's Motion for Discovery under Rule 56(f) Should Have Been
Granted.
5

Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his
opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just."
The Utah Supreme Court has held on "numerous occasions that rule 56(f) motions
opposing a summary judgment motion on the ground that discovery has not been completed
should be granted liberally unless they are deemed dilatory or lacking in merit." Salt Lake
County v. Western Dairymen Coop, 48 P.3d 910 (Utah 2002) (citing Price Dev. Co. v. Orem
City, 995 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000); CrosslandSav. v. Hatch, 877 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1994); and
Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984)).
In this case, there were no interrogatories, no requests for admission, no requests for
production, no depositions. There was simply no time to do them before Appellee filed it's
motion to dismiss. As such, there cannot be any finding that Appellant's motion was
dilatory. Nor could their motion be seen to be lacking in merit. Not a single person
involved in the original litigation could be classified as an internet expert, except for the
self-serving assertion of Defendant's affidavit supplying witness. There could be no way
to dispute any of the facts, neither general about the process, Internet, or pop ups; nor the
specific facts pertaining to the actual events. Not without discovery. Discovery would have
allowed the parties to determine several material facts, including a determination of the
method of sending pop-ups from one computer to another. This was set forth in Plaintiff s
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rule 56(f) motion and memorandum. The lower court had enough basis to grant the
continuance requested. It was error to deny it.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellant respectfully requests this
Court reverse the lower court's ruling that Pop-up advertisements are not governed under
the Utah Unsolicited Commercial and Sexually Explicit Email Act, and further remand this
matter back to the lower court to allow for appropriate discovery to occur.

DATED this

n

I \ day of July, 2004.
NELSOH,/SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN

Denver CL Snmffer, Jr.
Attorney ibrAppellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served two true and correct copies of the foregoing
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Randy L. Dryer (0924)
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PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
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1day of July, 2004.
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ADDENDUM
There are no exhibits attached as Addenda to this Reply Brief.

